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When one thinks of "wrongful convictions and reliability in the crimi-
nal justice process" one often thinks of street crime convictions of defen-
dants later proven innocent through DNA or other scientific evidence. 1
Implanting white collar crime in this ballpark seems misplaced and perhaps
offensive to some. After all, could there really be innocent individuals or
corporations among the affluent federal criminals who were convicted of
deliberately perpetrating frauds that caused the loss of life-savings and
pensions of many victims? And if there are innocent defendants in the
white collar sphere, do they merit consideration? After all one envisions
these individuals and entities with sufficient funds to secure top-notch rep-
resentation to argue their case through the judicial process.
The stories presented in this Article are not intended to demean the
importance of more typical innocence cases, or say that street crime cases
involving drugs, sex crimes, or others in the federal system are not signifi-
cantly affected by a judicial system reliant upon a federal sentencing guide-
line system with high penalties. Nor is this Article meant to place the
collateral consequences that can devastate a corporation above the conse-
quences to the typical individual defendant who bears enormous collateral
consequences, such as losing a job that serves as the funding source to feed
a family. This Article merely shows that innocence is no longer the key
determinant in some aspects of the federal criminal justice system, even for
those charged with white collar offenses. Rather, our existing legal system
places the risk of going to trial, and in some cases even being charged with
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. Thanks go to Professor Robert Batey
and the participants of the Criminal Procedure Symposium for their comments on an earlier draft.
Thanks also go to Dean Darby Dickerson and Stetson University College of Law for their research
support.
1. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2008) (discussing
a free-standing innocence claim); Daniel S. Medwed, Looking Foreword: Wrongful Convictions and
Systemic Reform, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1117 (2005) (introducing symposium on wrongful convic-
tions); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Convic-
tion Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) (providing empirical evidence to justify legal
reform).
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a crime, 2 so high, that innocence and guilt no longer become the real con-
siderations. This is especially true for upper level white collar offenders
like CEOs3 and corporate entities. 4 In these cases maneuvering the system
to receive the least onerous consequences may ensure the best result for the
accused party, regardless of innocence.
5
I. THREE STORIES
Arthur Andersen LLP, Jamie Olis, and Jeffrey Skilling proceeded to
trial after criminal charges were brought against them. In contrast, KPMG,
Gene Foster, and Andrew Fastow secured plea agreements or deferred
prosecution agreements with reduced sentences and finite results. As one
might imagine, the latter group's sentences or fines were significantly be-
low those of the individuals and entities that proceeded to trial. The pro-
nounced gap between those risking trial and those securing pleas is what
raises concerns here. Some refer to this as a "trial penalty ' 6 while others
value the cooperation and support the vastly reduced sentences. 7
A.Arthur Andersen, LLP & KPMG
Arthur Andersen, LLP, was charged under an obstruction of justice
2. This Article does not speak to consequences that may accompany the charging process, such
as having individuals subjected to a "perp walk." See Ashby Jones, The 'Perp Walk': Debate: Prejudi-
cial or Legit?, Wall St. J. Law Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/06/19/the-perp-walk-debate-prejudicial-or-legit/ (June 19, 2008, 16:42
PM).
3. The list of CEOs to receive high sentences has grown in the last few years. For example:
Bernie Ebbers, CEO of Worldcom (25 years); Dennis Kozlowski, CEO Tyco (8.5-25.0 years); John
Rigas. CEO Adelphia (12 years); Jeffrey Skilling (24 years). See Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the
Key, 116 YALE POCKET PART 279 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/02/21/podgor.html.
4. Companies that are subject to debarment (defense contractors), government exclusions (health
care providers), and shareholder derivative actions are particularly susceptible to collateral conse-
quences that can destroy the company if convicted of a crime. See generally Candace Zierdt and Ellen
S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecution Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY.
L.J. 1 (2007-08).
5. Clearly this process raises concerns regarding the right to trial by jury under the Sixth
Amendment. This Article does not confront these concerns and leaves this discussion for another day.
6. See, e.g,, Douglas A. Berman, Newspaper article on the "trial penalty ", Sentencing Law &
Policy Blog, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2006/03/newspaper-artic.htmi
(March 28, 2006, 1:58 AM) (citing Paula Reed Ward, Plead Guilty or go to trial?, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06086/677199-85.stm (March 27, 2006)); Tom Kirkendall,
Hedging the Enron trial penalty, Houston's Clear Thinkers,
http://blog.kir.con/archives/2008/10/hedging-the-enr.asp (Oct. 15, 2008, 12:01 AM).
7. See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) ("No practice is
more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who
is an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a
plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence."); see also Bryan S. Gowdy, Leniency Bribes:
Justifying the Federal Practice of Offering Leniency for Testimony, 60 LA. L. REv. 447 (2000) (discuss-
ing the importance of allowing prosecutors to offer leniency for testimony).
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statute8 for its alleged conduct of instructing "employees to destroy docu-
ments pursuant to its document retention policy." 9 The defendant argued
that it was "encouraging its employees to comply with the firm's standard
document retention policy during the four-week period that preceded the
[Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)]'s initiation of a formal proceed-
ing concerning Enron Corporation in 2001."10 The government claimed the
document destruction was a deliberate act to "prevent Enron's and its own
financial misdeeds and aggressive accounting from being uncovered by the
SEC."' "I After a trial by jury, the company was convicted and eventually
sentenced to five years probation and fined the maximum allowed for this
offense under law, a fine of five hundred thousand ($500,000) dollars.
12
Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed this conviction, 13 the Supreme Court
reversed. 14
The fine imposed on the company in the Arthur Andersen, LLP case
proved inconsequential in comparison to a collateral consequence of the
conviction-that Andersen was precluded from auditing public compa-
nies. 15 Thus, the company died upon conviction, and the later reversal by
the Supreme Court was worthless to the defunct company. 16 It made no
difference that the Supreme Court raised the concern that the jury could
have used "innocent conduct" in its finding of guilt because of the im-
proper instruction provided to them. 17 The Supreme Court's acknowledg-
ment of the infirmities in the jury instructions offered no relief to the
company's ability to continue business. A collateral consequence of the
jury's finding was that thousands of innocent employees who worked for
the company lost their jobs. 18
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000).
9. 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).
10. See Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur Andersen, LLP and Martha Stewart: Should Materiality be an
Element of Obstruction of Justice, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 586-87 (2005) (citing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 2004 WL 2070872, at *9 (U.S. 2004)).
11. Id. (citing Brief of the United States in Opposition at *1, Arthur Andersen, LLP, 125 S. Ct.
823 (2004) (No. 04-368)).
12. Id. (discussing the penalties given to the company upon conviction).
13. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2004).
14. See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).
15. See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 108 (2006) (noting how the conviction led to an "inability to
audit public companies"); see also Podgor, supra note 10, at 586-87(discussing the fall of Arthur
Andersen, LLP).
16. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons From
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRM. L. REV. 165, 173-76 (2004)
(discussing collateral consequences to Andersen).
17. See Arthur Anderson, 544 U.S. at 706-08 (2005) (noting that the jury instructions "failed to
convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing").
18. In the United States alone, more than 28,000 individuals lost their jobs. Carrie Johnson, High
2010]
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Contrast the Arthur Andersen case with what happened to KPMG. 19
KPMG, also an accounting and auditing firm, allowed a one count Informa-
tion for conspiracy to be filed against the company. The specific acts al-
leged were "(i) to defraud the United States and its agency the Internal
Revenue Service; (ii) commit tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201;
and (iii) make and subscribe false and fraudulent tax returns, and aid and
assist in the preparation and filing of said tax returns in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7206."20 In a deferred prosecution agreement, KPMG admitted to
violating the law. The company agreed to cooperate with the government in
its criminal investigation, to implement a compliance and ethics program,
and to have a monitor "review and monitor KPMG's compliance with the
agreement."'21 KPMG also agreed not to assert any rights of attorney-client
privilege. 22 Under the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement, the
company paid 456 million dollars.23
In the KPMG case the company's employees retained their jobs, the
business remained viable, and there were no collateral consequences that
would cause a demise of the firm. Not only was there no debarment in the
KPMG case, but the deferred prosecution agreement specifically noted that
the company could continue "to audit the Department of Justice's financial
statements" 24 as the department's debarring official proclaimed them to be
a "responsible contractor. '25 Compliance with the deferred prosecution
agreement ultimately meant a dismissal of the charging Information.
26
One can easily argue that Anderson was more culpable than KPMG,
and therefore deserving of a harsher punishment. 27 To assert this claim,
however, presents the obvious question as to why the fine to be imposed
Court Will Hear Andersen Appeal, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2005, at El, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57805-2005Jan7.html.
19. Professor Samuel W. Buell also uses, as his examples, Arthur Andersen and KPMG. His
discussion focuses on "the blaming of an institution for a wrong." See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming
Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006).
20. Letter from David N. Kelley, United States Attorney, Southern District of N.Y., to Robert S.
Bennett, Esq., KPMG Attorney,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf (Aug. 26, 2005).
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id.
23. Id. ("[P]ayments are attributable to the following: a fine consisting of disgorgement of
$128,000,000 of fees received by KPMG from the activities described in the Statement of Facts; restitu-
tion to the IRS of $228,000,000 for actual losses ... and an IRS penalty of $100,000,000.")
24. This Article leaves to another day a discussion as to any possible conflict by the Department
of Justice for including as part of this deferred prosecution agreement that the company can continue to
serve as the government's auditors.
25. See Kelley, supra note 20.
26. Id. at 13.
27. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fall From Grace, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 917, 919-31
(2003) (discussing Andersen's "liability as a firm").
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against Arthur Andersen was significantly less than that paid by KPMG. 28
This is because the punishment imposed under law was not the real pun-
ishment suffered by the company in the Andersen case. Rather, it was the
collateral consequences which accompanied the conviction that caused the
demise of Arthur Andersen LLP. KPMG, which paid a greater fine and
consented to monitor oversight, avoided the collateral consequences by
cooperating with the government.
B. Jamie Olis & Gene Foster
Jamie Olis was the Senior Director of Tax Planning and International
at Dynegy29, where he worked on a transaction referred to as "Project Al-
pha." In essence, "Project Alpha was a plan to borrow $300 million and
make it appear to the outside world" and the auditors, "as if the money was
generated by Dynegy's business operations." 30 The scheme was discovered
when the "SEC required Dynegy to restate the cash flow as derived from a
'financing' rather than 'operations."'' 31 Jamie Olis, along with his boss at
Dynegy, Gene Foster, and a co-worker, Helen Sharkey, were indicted for
this fraudulent activity. 32 Olis opted for trial and was convicted of "securi-
ties fraud, mail and wire fraud and conspiracy. '33 Foster and Sharkey both
opted for pleas that included cooperation.
34
Initially, Jamie Olis received a twenty-four year sentence, despite the
fact that he had no prior criminal record. 35 The high sentence reflected a
loss of $105 million to the University of California Retirement System, use
of "sophisticated means," having a "special skill" to carry out the fraud,
and more than fifty victims of the fraudulent activity. 36 This sentence was
eventually overturned when the Fifth Circuit, in an opinion authored by
Judge Edith H. Jones, concluded that a "substantial portion of the entire
28. The government only charged Arthur Andersen, LLP with one count under of obstruction of
justice. In contrast, KPMG's deferred prosecution agreement had allegations under the conspiracy
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Kelley, supra note 20.
29. He later became the Vice President of Finance. See United States v. Otis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th
Cir. 2005).
30. Id. at 541.
31. Id. at 542.
32. See Simon Romero, Former Employees of Dynegy Face Charges of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2008, at BI.
33. Olis, 429 F.3d at 541.
34. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 741-42 (2007) (discussing the Otis sentence).
35. See Kris Axtman, Cases test new flexibility of sentencing guidelines, The Christian Science
Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0218/p02s01 -ussc.htm (Feb. 18, 2005).
36. Olis, 429 F.3d. at 542-43.
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loss . . . could not have been caused by Olis's work on Project Alpha. '37
On remand, Jamie Olis received a sentence of six years.
38
Gene Foster and Helen Sharkey opted not to go to trial. Foster cooper-
ated with the government and testified at Olis's trial. Despite being Olis's
boss who approved his work, Foster received a sentence of fifteen
months. 39 Helen Sharkey, a co-worker, received a one month sentence.
40
Olis's innocence claim continues to this day with allegations that he
was denied funding for his legal counsel, 41 counsel that he argues he was
entitled to have as an employee at Dynegy.42 Even the court at re-
sentencing noted that "[a]lthough Olis was intimately involved in the con-
spiracy and in planning Project Alpha, he did not have the ultimate author-
ity at Dynegy to approve Project Alpha, nor was he responsible for drafting
the documents by which the conspiracy was carried out and concealed. '43
Yet despite these conclusions, Olis's sentence was nearly five times greater
than the individual with the authority to approve the activities. Olis risked
trial on a claim of innocence, and having been found guilty, his sentence
enormously exceeded individuals who cooperated with the government.
C. Jeffrey Skilling & Andrew Fastow
Jeffrey K. Skilling's testimony before the House Energy and Com-
merce Oversight Investigations Subcommittee caused "eyes to roll." 44 The
financial collapse of Enron was met with questions and investigation. Skill-
ing, the former CEO of Enron, was indicted along with now-deceased Ken-
neth L. Lay, also a former CEO of Enron, and Richard A. Causey, Enron's
Chief Accounting Officer.45 Richard Causey pled guilty to one count of
37. Id. at 548.
38. See United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22,
2006), affg in part, rev'g in part 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005).




41. Peter Henning, Attorney's Fees for Olis' Counsel, White Color Crime Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2007/05/attorneys fees_.html (May 18, 2007).
42. The district court did not accept Otis's argument, for purposes of granting bail only, that his
"Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights [were denied] by using threat of indictment to pressure Dynergy to
cut off his access to defense funds." See Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-01
at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2008), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/march32008.pdf (last visited Sep. 23,
2009).
43. Id.; see also Podgor, supra note 34, at 742-43.
44. Videotape: Enron's Skilling Answers Markey at Hearing; Eyes Roll, (C-Span 2002), at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPqH3DrWEEU).
45. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Causey, Cr. No. H-04-25 (S-2),
[Vol 85:1
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securities fraud46 and received a sentence of sixty-six months.47 Lay and
Skilling proceeded to trial. As a result of his death, Kenneth Lay's convic-
tion was abated.48 Skilling, however, was convicted of securities and wire
fraud. He initially received a sentence of over twenty-four years.49 Al-
though this sentence will be modified, it seems unlikely that a reduction in
this sentence will dissipate the gross disparity in sentence between his sen-
tence and the cooperating witness who did not go to trial.
A key witness at the Skilling/Lay trial was Andrew Fastow, who had
served as Enron's Chief Financial Officer. Fastow reached a plea with the
government that allowed him to plead to two counts of conspiracy, 50 an
agreement that called for his extensive cooperation. 51 Under the terms of
the agreement, Andrew Fastow was to receive a sentence of ten years 52 and
it was agreed that he would "not move for a downward departure from the
offense level or guideline range calculated by the Court and that no
grounds for a downward departure exist. ' 53 At sentencing, however, with
no objection from the government, Fastow received a sentence of six
years.54
Fastow's sentence of six years is a sharp contrast to the twenty-four
plus years initially given to Jeffrey K. Skilling. Skilling continues to main-
tain his innocence 55 and his appeal in the Fifth Circuit resulted in a denial
http://fl I .findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usvlay70704ind.pdf (July 7, 2004).
46. Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Causey Heads To Prison for Role in Enron, WASH. POST, Jan. 3,
2007, at DI.
47. Ellen S. Podgor, Causey Off to Prison, White Collar Crime Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2007/OJ/causeyo--tffJo-p.html (Jan. 3, 2007).
48. See Lay's Enron Conviction 'Abated' Due to Death, (NPR broadcast Oct. 18, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6288956.
49. Skilling's initial sentence was for 292 months imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit remanded the
case for resentencing. Although the court rejected Skilling's argument that the court erred in consider-
ing "Skilling's SEC testimony at sentencing," the en banc court did find error in the court's use of "an
enhancement for substantially jeopardizing a 'financial institution."' See United States v. Skilling, 554
F.3d 529, 591-95 (5th Cir. 2009).
50. Andrew S. Fastow pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit
wire and securities fraud. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Andrew Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-0665,
http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usafastow11404plea.pdf (last visited Sept.
23, 2009).
51. Id. at 4. The agreement also was conditioned on a plea on the part of Lea W. Fastow, the wife
of Andrew Fastow. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 1-2.
53. Id. at 2-3.
54. Ellen S. Podgor, Fastow Receives A Six Year Sentence, White Collar Crime Prof Blog,
http://awprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/09/fastow-receives.html (September 26,
2006).
55. Former Enron CEO Skilling Gets 24 Years, MSNBC,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15389150/ (Oct. 23, 2006, 7:15 PM) (discussing how Skilling at sen-
tencing continued to maintain his innocence).
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of his substantive criminal law claims, but entitled him to have his sentence
modified.
II. THE MORAL OF THESE STORIES
Clearly one can argue that Arthur Andersen, LLP, Jamie Olis, and Jef-
frey Skilling all deserve punishment, and that the amount of punishment
received was warranted in each case. This, however, remains unclear as
one case (Andersen) was reversed and the other two (Olis and Skilling)
continue to maintain that the level of culpability attributed to them was
improper. But whether the punishment was appropriate is not the focus of
this Article. The real moral of these stories is not whether the punishment
was warranted, but rather the appropriateness of the level of risk that one
has to take to proceed to trial, and the chilling effect of the high risk caused
by the "trial penalty. '' 56 Innocence becomes irrelevant as the real question
becomes whether it is worth the risk of testing an innocence claim.
Professor Russell D. Covey examines sentence differences between
cases resolved via plea bargains and those that proceed to trial. 57 He advo-
cates elimination of "the punitive trial sentences that coerce defendants to
accept the plea-bargained alternative through adoption of a device referred
to herein as 'plea-based ceilings.' 58 His call for "mandatory caps or ceil-
ings on trial sentences" ' 59 is a forceful solution that can restore the value of
the constitutional right of trial by jury.
60
Professor Covey's article is not focused on white collar crime, and
there may be some unique aspects to these corporate related cases. In white
collar crime cases it is not merely the sentences that can necessitate the
need for a plea. It also can be a function of collateral consequences such as
civil suits by shareholders, or the indictment stigma that can significantly
harm business. As noted, the penalty paid by KPMG was higher than the
fine given after trial to Arthur Andersen, LLP.
Jamie Olis took the risk because he believed he was innocent of the
charges levied against him. This risk cost him an initial sentence that was
288 times greater than a non-risk taker and an eventual sentence that was
approximately seventy-two times greater than a co-worker who decided not
56. See Berman, supra note 6; Kirkendall, supra note 6.
57. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining With Plea-Based Ceilings,
82 TUL. L. REv. 1237, 1237 (2008).
58. Id. at 1242.
59. Id.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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to take the risk of going to trial.61 His boss, who also did not risk trial, re-
ceived a sentence less than one quarter of what Olis received.
62
Jeffrey Skilling also proclaimed his innocence and continues to this
day to do so. Irrespective of whether one accepts his claim of not guilty, the
reality is that he initially received a sentence four times greater than the
individual who pled and cooperated with the government. 63 Whether the
Fifth Circuit's remand 64 will provide a closer differential between the Skill-
ing and Fastow sentence is uncertain, but experts' reports find this to be
unlikely. 65
Perhaps the highest level of risk is demonstrated in the corporate
sphere, especially when the risk can cause the death of the organization
because of its inability to continue to perform its job function.66 The An-
dersen case, as well as the later court determination reversing the convic-
tion, demonstrates that the actual criminal fine is insignificant. In contrast,
the risk of trial and its immediate consequences can be devastating to the
company. Match this result against a corporate deferred prosecution, and
the corporation would be foolish to take the trial route67 as it is rare that
one hears of a corporation going to trial and being found not guilty. 68
Whether any of the recent deferred prosecution agreements are examples of
wrongful convictions, is unknown, as many corporations are not in a posi-
tion to assert a claim of innocence because of the possible consequences
should a jury return a guilty finding.
These three stories provide symbolic examples of the disparity be-
tween selecting trial and entering a plea with cooperation. Some improve-
61. Helen Sharkey, a co-worker, received a sentence of one month. See Henning, supra note 39.
Of course one can claim that her lower sentence is because of an acceptance of responsibility and
cooperation. But, one could also argue that Olis received a higher sentence because of arrogance and
assertion of his constitutional right to trial.
62. See Id.
63. Andrew Fastow's sentence was for six years. See Plea Agreement, supra note 50.
64. See United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 591-95 (5th Cir. 2009).
65. See Jef Feeley & Thom Weidlich, Skilling Wins Resentencing After Getting 24-Year Term,
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid=20601103&sid=aB I n I kNiYls4&refer=us
(Jan. 7, 2009) (noting that experts believe that there will be little change in Skilling's sentence on
remand); Dan Slater, Skilling Conviction Upheld, Resentencing Ordered, Wall St. J. Law Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2O09/0I/06/skilling-conviction-upheld-resentencing-ordered/ (Jan. 6, 2009)
(discussing how Skilling's sentence could remain the same on remand).
66. See Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 4, at 2.
67. This Article is not advocating against corporate deferred prosecutions, as these agreements
play an important role in the judicial process. They are especially important when the corporate crimi-
nality is premised upon wrongdoing by a rogue employee. See generally Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 4,
at 8.
68. W.R. Grace was found not guilty following a jury trial on alleged environmental crimes. See
Ellen S. Podgor, W. R. Grace - Not Guilty, White Collar Crime Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/verdict/ (May 8, 2009).
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ment has been made to move the risk-controller from the hands of the
prosecution into the hands of the judiciary as a result of recent Supreme
Court decisions. The recent cases of Booker,69 Gall,70 and Kimbrough,
71
allow judges increased discretion at sentencing. Judges can now focus on
section 3553(a) 72 factors and deviate from the federal sentencing guidelines
when the guideline sentence is "'greater than necessary' to serve the objec-
tives of sentencing. ' 73 There have also been internal limits in the corporate
sphere that rein in prosecutorial power in deferred prosecution agree-
ments. 74
Writings about the deficiencies in the plea bargaining process with re-
spect to innocence are not new, and some have chosen to defend the proc-
ess in the wake of innocence cases. For example, Professor Josh Bowers,
writes that the "typical innocent defendant in the typical case... is a recidi-
vist facing petty charges. ' 75 He notes that these innocent defendants are
receiving lesser consequences in a world with plea-bargaining than one
without it being available. 76 But those charged with white collar crimes do
not fit this mold, as they usually are not recidivists, and often the penalties
faced may be lengthy ones or have severe ramifications to those who have
no criminal culpability.
This Article is not, however, to rehash the process that allows an inno-
cent or guilty person, or entity, the option to reduce a sentence through plea
bargaining. Rather, the focus here is on the gravity of the risk incurred in
proceeding to trial, and the result that innocence becomes insignificant in
the decision-making process, especially in the corporate arena. It is this
reality that makes white collar matters prime as candidates for future
wrongful convictions, even if the numbers to date do not demonstrate a
69. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the Sixth Amendment's right to
trial by jury applies to the federal sentencing guidelines).
70. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595 (2007) (allowing for a sentence outside the guide-
lines even when there is no showing of extraordinary circumstances).
71. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) (allowing judicial discretion for a sentence
outside the guidelines range).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2003). The statute provides the "[flactors to be considered in imposing a
sentence" such as "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant" and the "the kinds of sentences available." Id.
73. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564. See generally Eang Ngov, Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use
of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing, 76 TENN. L. REv. 235 (2009) (discussing increased discretion of
judges at sentencing).
74. See generally Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1434 (2007) (discussing the McNulty Memo).
75. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1117, 1119-20 (2008). He notes that




sharp decrease in risk-taking in the white collar realm. 77
CONCLUSION
The reward of a "not guilty" verdict at trial comes at a high cost. There is
the high cost of going to trial, a cost that far exceeds the typical street crime
because of the long investigation and trial and in large part because these
cases are predominantly a product of documents.78 It can also be a short-
lived verdict when the government decides to proceed against the individ-
ual with a second prosecution, even after a not guilty finding.
79
Clearly, many of the individuals charged with crimes by the federal
government are in fact guilty of these criminal acts and deserve to be pun-
ished with a prison sentence. Likewise, many of the entities deserve to be
fined for their criminal conduct. That said, it is problematic that the mes-
sage being sent today is that trials carry enormous risk, and even if inno-
cent, the best route may be to proceed with a finding of guilt or deferred
prosecution.
This means that innocence or guilt does not frame the judicial process
in white collar cases. The risk of trial becomes so great that in order to
minimize the possible consequences innocence becomes an irrelevancy.
Although the plea bargain to trial differential existed for many years in
crimes outside the white collar crime context, the high sentences now being
given to individuals and entities charged with white collar crimes place
those crimes in comparable stead with street crimes. This gives pause to
whether the next phase of wrongful convictions might move beyond street
crimes into the white collar world.
77. The appendix to this Article provides data from select crimes reported by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE
CATEGORY TABLE 11 (1997), http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1997/tablell.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY TABLE 1i (2007),
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/Table11 .pdf. Seven key white collar offenses are used to show the
difference in guilty pleas and trials in 1997 and then ten years later in 2007. In all categories except one,
there is an increase in the percentage of cases proceeding via plea as opposed to trial. The most notice-
able increase in pleas is seen in the antitrust area, with a slight decrease in pleas seen with bribery cases.
Id.
78. See Peter J. Henning, Lawyers Don't Come Cheap These Days, White Collar Crime Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime -blog/2007/10/lawyers-dont-co.htmI (Oct. 13, 2007)
(discussing attorney fees in recent white collar cases); Susan Beck, Companies With Backdating Trou-
bles Are Paying Astronomical Legal Fees, AMERICAN LAWYER,
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=900005493308&slreturn=l&hbxlogin=l (October
12, 2007).
79. Scrushy Pleads Not Guilty to New Charges, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at C2 (discussing how
the Department of Justice charged Richard Scrushy with new charges following his not guilty verdict
after a trial by jury). Of course, the 1988 Hyde Amendment provides relief to defendants who are
subjected to government prosecutions that are "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith." See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1998).
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80. See supra note 77.
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